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Social Identity and Redistributive
Preferences: A Survey
Joan Costa Font and Frank Cowell
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract
Social identity has become accepted as a key concept underpinning
the endogeneity of economic behaviour and preferences. It is impor-
tant in explaining attitudes towards redistribution and pro-social be-
haviour. We examine how economic theory measures social identity
and its eﬀects on preferences towards redistribution, social solidar-
ity and redistributive institutions. Empirical evidence indicates that
social identity carries weight in explaining the presence of social pref-
erences and attitudes towards redistributive institutions.
Keywords: social identity, preferences for redistribution, inequal-
ity, diversity, redistributive institutions. JEL: H1, I3.
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1 Introduction
The standard consumer-sovereignty principle assumes that people make deci-
sions based upon their own utilities that in turn represent their independent,
exogenous preferences. But it has long been recognised in economics that this
may be an oversimpliﬁcation: the social and cultural environment with which
the agent interacts aﬀects the agent's behaviour by inﬂuencing preferences
and attitudes (Veblen 1899). Of course standard decision-making models can
be adapted to incorporate departures from such a framework, resulting from
limited information, agency relationships and network externalities involving
other people's actions. However, economists have only recently examined
the phenomenon of preference interdependence in greater depth and so it is
useful to revisit a such central issue in the economics discipline. One spe-
ciﬁc route to incorporate preference interdependence is to explicitly model
identity and its eﬀects on behaviour.
Social identity has been deﬁned in social psychology as that part of an
individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership
in a social group (Tajfel 1978). So identity relies on a shared psychological
or physical category. But how does identity inﬂuence traditional decision-
making models? We argue that the extent to which identity inﬂuences pref-
erences has wide-ranging implications for welfare economics and calls into
question the independence of welfare analysis built upon exogenous individ-
ual preferences (Zizzo 2003). More speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of social identity
may provide some clues as to why population diversity reduces altruism and
redistribution: for example Luttmer (2001) ﬁnds a suggestive negative rela-
tionship between diversity and preferences for redistribution.
This paper provides an overview of the literature of identity and its eﬀect
on redistribution attitudes. We examine whether an individual's attitudes
towards the other members of society, the institutions that guarantee redistri-
bution and the underlying preferences towards a world of more redistribution
are driven by social identity. In doing so we address the following questions:
 What do economists understand by social identity and how does it
diﬀer from other similar concepts such as social motivation, group ex-
ternalities and more general concepts of network eﬀects and culture?
 How does the economics literature conceptualise preferences and at-
titudes towards fairness, particularly about redistributive institutions
and policies?
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 Is there evidence of a potential relationship between social identity,
preferences for redistribution and attitudes toward the welfare state?
Empirical evidence is available from both econometric and experimental stud-
ies; the latter has the obvious advantage that it controls for unobserved ef-
fects and can be monitored more easily (internal validity), at the cost of
losing some external validity. We attempt to classify the existing approaches
and evidence to provide a summary picture of the state of the art and to
suggest some ways forward.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the idea
of identity in economics and its possible relationship with social preferences.
Section 3 discusses the evidence on the determinants and preferences for
redistribution and outlines how social identity may help in explaining some
stylised facts; it examines the meanings of social identity in economic theory.
Section 4 assesses the available evidence on the eﬀects of social identity on
redistribution and pro-social attitudes, drawing upon diﬀerent relevant social
dimensions. Section 5 provides a discussion of the existing ﬁndings along with
an evaluation of the ways forward and oﬀers some conclusions.
2 Redistributional Preferences and Identity
Redistribution is one of the central features of welfare states. Clearly, the
maintenance of redistributive institutions largely depends on individual sup-
port for taxing higher incomes more heavily and targeting expenditures to
social need. Our focus here is on individuals' willingness to redistribute.
Diﬀerent forms of redistribution and altruism are constrained by individual
attitudes through some form of aggregation rule; changes in the willingness
of people to pay taxes, to transfer resources to the neediest and support
for redistribution-enhancing institutions may induce signiﬁcant changes in
redistribution. The extent of subjective willingness to accept redistributive
transfers and its relation to actual redistribution is something that calls for
empirical investigation: it is important to establish a framework that appro-
priately represents what appears to go on in the real world and to identify
the key variables in the supposed relationship. If subjective preferences for
redistribution determine tolerance of redistribution in practice, then the un-
derlying mechanisms of such attitudes should be examined and integrated
into economic models.
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One potential constraint lies in the group formation of preferences. By
this we mean the assumption that people's preferences for redistribution are
interdependent in the sense that they are inﬂuenced by the characteristics
of other people around them (Luttmer 2001). People appear to be more
likely to redistribute to the groups they identify with, be that identiﬁcation
based on ethnicity, religious group, social class, nation state or region. The
importance of shared identities lies is this: when people fail to match with
one identity category they may not put weight on redistribution towards
members of that category, or they may develop oppositional identities which
can explain segregation and isolation (Battu and Zenou 2010).
Not only attitudes matter in explaining behaviour. Economic behaviour
is the result of the interaction between people's attitudes and their social
environment, the latter being a principal source of interdependence. The ex-
tent to which individuals internalise their social environment by adopting the
values of a social group is reﬂected in diﬀerences in social identity. In that
way social identity can potentially determine the extent of individual altru-
ism towards the members of a group vis-a-vis those outside the group. As a
consequence, changes in the deﬁnition and categorisation of what the group
values and whom it includes may have a non-negligible inﬂuence on an indi-
vidual's altruistic behaviour or attitudes toward redistribution. Groups de-
velop common shared meanings (cultures as deﬁned by Guiso et al. 2006),
constrained by prior common values and social norms; some of their mem-
bers' behaviour is path dependent, rather than being chosen by individuals
themselves at every point in time.
The inclusion of social identity in decision-making models, however it is
conceived, challenges the assumption of preference independence by drawing
upon some form of collective deﬁnition of the self. It calls for a reconsidera-
tion of the formation of both individual and social-welfare functions. Social
identity is environmentally learned and instrumentally determined by objec-
tively identiﬁable psychosocial traits (such as language, social class and gen-
der). Similarly, it is constructed and reinforced through several forms of so-
cial interaction spreading information on social norms and values. The group
shapes individuals' preferences by deﬁning a sense of belonging, namely, a
collective deﬁnition of the self that parallels and to some extent comple-
ments that of the individual. To explain these externalities further, Akerlof
(1997) presents two behavioural models: people either try to increase their
social distance (when they are status seeking) or they align themselves more
closely (by adopting a conformist behaviour) with certain social categories.
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In the later case, an individual suﬀers disutility from deviating from his or
her category norms, which causes behaviour to conform toward those norms
even when it encompasses sacriﬁces to their own well-being (Costa-i-Font
and Jofre-Bonet 2012).
The seminal paper by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conceptualises these
ideas formally by considering a set of social categories and associated pre-
scriptions, so that identity gives rise to a utility gain from conforming in-
dividual's actions to the prescriptions of each social category. Identity is
envisaged as a sense of self or self-image nested in social categories: a per-
son's social environment encompasses a set of prescriptive norms, so that
people are willing to sacriﬁce material pay-oﬀs to meet such social norms.
Luttmer (2001) provides empirical evidence showing that individual prefer-
ences for redistribution depend on the characteristics of people around them.
He shows evidence of a negative exposure eﬀect whereby people decrease
their support for welfare programmes as the welfare recipiency in their com-
munity rises. Similarly, they show evidence of a racial group eﬀect suggest-
ing that people increase their support for welfare spending as the share of
the recipients from their own racial group increase. Bisin et al. (2008) and
Battu et al. (2007) construct a model of ethnic identity formation focusing
on how choice of identity is aﬀected by cultural transmission. In their model,
social interactions that lead to identity formation are conceptualised as a net-
work externality that can explain several economic phenomena, for instance
why employment rates of white population are associated with that of non-
whites. Using experimental data Klor and Shayo (2010) ﬁnd that people's
preferences over redistribution are aﬀected by the payoﬀs of other in-group
members. Shayo (2009) generalises Akerlof and Kranton (2000), and Klor
and Shayo (2010) consider identity as resulting from perceived group status,
namely the relative position of a group in a hierarchy of categories (such as
occupation or education) and its distance from, or similarity with, that of
other members of the group. Group identiﬁcation comes from two processes:
the ﬁrst process is where people care about the status of the group (relative
status) and the second process is deﬁned by an individual's conscious willing-
ness to resemble other group members (distance or proximity). The former
could be categorised as a speciﬁc form of esteem-dependent behaviour.
Broadly speaking, one may claim that social identity gives rise to in-
dividual actions to protect the social self which include reciprocity and
welfare-maximising actions, which in turn give rise to social preferences. Ex-
amples of the inﬂuence of identity include religious identity eﬀects on the
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contribution to public goods and worker reciprocity (Benjamin et al. 2010).
The latter can be tested experimentally by means of environmental cues (also
called primes) that can temporarily make a certain social category more
salient to certain groups, causing a person's behaviour to tilt more toward the
norms associated with the salient category. Social identity, as we will discuss
later, can be shown to inﬂuence, for example, tipping behaviour, blood and
organ donation or even participation in electoral processes (the vote turn-out
puzzle), despite the tangible net individual beneﬁt of such behaviour being
regarded as being almost negligible. Using status as a market-clearing vari-
able Shayo (2009) suggests two possible equilibria to explain the vote turn
our puzzle. In the ﬁrst one, the members of the lower class (who constitute a
majority) identify with their class: as a consequence they vote for a relatively
high level of redistribution; this can in turn help strengthen class identity by
endowing it with a higher status. In the second type of equilibrium, mem-
bers of the lower income (working) class tend to think of themselves more as
members of the nation as a whole than as members of a low-status part of it.
Findings suggest that a common national thread and extensive heterogeneity
among the working class weakens working-class solidarity.
Besides redistribution itself, social identity may exert an inﬂuence on
redistributive institutions. The latter refers primarily to the welfare state,
support for welfare services and social insurance schemes. Welfare states un-
dertake both redistribution (anonymous redistribution) and insurance (col-
lective risk sharing): both may be sensitive to the weakening of social identity.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that support for the welfare state will be
weakened as a result of increasing social heterogeneity. They demonstrate
that there is a negative correlation between racial fractionalization and
the level of social spending. This view has been challenged by the fact that
reliance of immigrants are perceived as groups that overwhelmingly receive
welfare beneﬁts (Boeri et al. 2002) even when empirical evidence of such
belief is very weak. However, recently Dahlberg et al. (2012) ﬁnds some
evidence of increased immigration eﬀects on the support for redistribution
using exogenous variation from policy migration reform in Sweden.
Now let us turn to the way identity has been given meaning within the
context of economic analysis.
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3 Identity and its meanings
3.1 Approaches to identity
Society can be divided into social groups based on various categorisations,
such as class, ethnicity, language and so on. People identify with some of
these categorisations and actions are assumed to follow from such identiﬁca-
tion. To account for this feature, the psychological theory of social identity
developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) can be applied to inter-group dis-
crimination in the form of a club good. Indeed, discrimination depends on
how people categorise each other, identify themselves with social categories
and compare each other in a way that may favourably bias their actions and
perceptions towards the group they identify with. Such identiﬁcation takes
place early in life for some categories. For instance, Weiland and Coughlin
(1979) show that White and Mexican-American children as young as four
exhibit some clear form of identity: apparently it turns out to engender an
ethnic preference for white classmates.
Belonging to a group provides people with self esteem and social norms;
conforming with the group norms nurtures a distinction from the rest of so-
ciety (Abrams and Hogg 1990). However, the social categories into which
people place themselves exist only in relation to other contrasting categories.
Hence, the value of each group identity derives from a comparison of those
within the group with with the traits of those in some other reference group.
Identity-driven behaviour is such that those traits that favour the in-group
are usually emphasised and within-group distinction will be minimised (Stets
and Burke 2000); group and individual outcomes are perceived as interde-
pendent. People tend to associate themselves with highly successful groups,
although membership  as in the case of ethnic or gender group  is not al-
ways chosen. Furthermore, not all members are equal: whilst weak members
of a group gain through the mere group identiﬁcation, relatively strong mem-
bers of the group strive to improve status by group identiﬁcation (Ellemers
et al. 1990).
It is possible to conclude that the process of identiﬁcation with a group is
endogenously determined, or even socially constructed to some degree. The
latter explains that group formation is inherently variable, ﬂuid, and context
dependent. McAdams (1995) even argues that groups use intra-group status
rewards as a non-material means of gaining material sacriﬁce from members.
People value the opinions of the groups to which they belong and seek to
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be acknowledged as members in good standing. However, in the case of
interaction with other groups, McAdams (1995) argues that discrimination
is a means by which social groups produce status for their members.
Alternative approaches outside economics suggest that identity refers to
the subjective expression of one's commitment to, sense of belonging to,
or self-identiﬁcation with the culture, values and beliefs of a speciﬁc ethnic
group and social life (Masuda et al. 1970, Makabe 1979, Unger et al. 2002).
The early work by Tajfel and Turner (1979) ﬁnds that people exhibit an
intra-group preference either when the group is central to their self-deﬁnition
(and a given comparison is meaningful) or, when it is instrumentally useful.
Most frequently employed uses of identity include cultural features such as
language, religion, media and food preferences, holiday celebrations and as-
sociated behaviour (Phinney 1990, 1992, Unger et al. 2002). Bellini et al.
(2009) conﬁrm that diversity is positively correlated with productivity.
Various strands of the economics literature are summarised below and
suggest an array of questions that recognise the importance of the social en-
vironment. These approaches reﬂect diﬀerent attempts of economic theory
to deal with the preference endogeneity assumption, either by assuming some
form of meta-preference (such as identity or social norms ), or by describing
the role of information externalities or social interactions. The economic en-
vironment may explain anomalies such as deviation for pure self-interested
preferences, by creating externalities that modify individual payoﬀs and ul-
timately inﬂuence attitudes towards redistribution.
3.2 Identity and economics
3.2.1 Concepts of identity
Social identity and choice
How identity inﬂuences choice and manifests itself is a dynamic process linked
to social interactions throughout the life course. In his path-breaking piece
about Edgeworth's rational egoistic man Sen (1977) refers to psychological
processes that underlie choice and relate to consumer decisions and produc-
tion activities. He introduced the concepts of sympathy and commitment as
part of the utility-maximizing function, arguing that commitment as part of
behaviour can result in non-gains-maximizing actions, even when individuals
are true to their preferences.
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However, it is the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) that is recog-
nised as the seminal contribution: this adopted a novel utility maximization
framework incorporating individual's self-identiﬁcation as a powerful motiva-
tion for behaviour. They introduced a redeﬁnition of the Tajfel and Turner
(1979) concept of identity in a standard neoclassical framework. A per-
son's self-image results from ﬁtting into a set of social categories that imply
expected behaviour valued in an economic utility function. Social identity
results from membership of some social group either chosen or given (such as
gender or ethnic group), which induces prescriptions that in turn cause util-
ity or disutility. If people achieve their ideal self and are comfortable with
their identity then their utility increases, otherwise, their utility decreases.
Norms and prescriptions arise endogenously from social interaction and over-
all outcomes are likely to diﬀer from what is predicted by models based on
pure individualistic models of choice because norms of appropriate and in-
appropriate behaviour diﬀer across space and time. For instance, within this
framework, it is then possible that even rational agents will choose subop-
timal occupations based on identity considerations, including public service
and duty.
Identity and social categorisations
The Akerlof and Kranton (2000) concept of identity can be envisaged as an
extension of the Akerlof (1997) contribution on social distance and social
decisions. This work extends previous work by the authors and is inspired
by Becker (1991) and Becker and Murphy (1993). Applications include gen-
der behaviour (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), education (Akerlof and Kranton
2002) and contract theory (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). In Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2005) they focus on intra-group eﬀects on cooperative behaviour. So,
if an agent internalises an organisation's objective and norms, it may suﬃce
as a form of motivation to sustain high eﬀort. Insiders will exert more eﬀort
than outsiders because they gain identity payoﬀs and accordingly corporate
eﬀorts to build organisational identity may produce returns. Hence, redis-
tributive preferences to a group may result from identity providing some form
of non-monetary or social reward.
Identity can also result from ideas and beliefs. Bénabou and Tirole (2007)
develop a complementary framework based on the individual management of
beliefs and identity investment In such a setting, for instance, parents may
purposely transmit distorted views about the reality of inequality and social
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mobility to their children in order to inﬂuence their incentives (Bénabou and
Tirole 2006).
Wichardt (2008) argues that identity is multidimensional. It may be
that tradeoﬀs arise in people's categorisations of identity, so that the various
weights for diﬀerent categories may not be perfectly aligned and can even
become mutually contradictory. Identity may be the result of a choice of the
social categories that provide higher perceived status. The idea that there are
identity gains through group membership assumes that all group members are
equal and that each attributes group success to himself. Increased in-group
homogeneity and a small group size facilitate the individual's identiﬁcation
(or social aﬃliation) with the respective group. In essence each individual will
focus especially on those groups which oﬀer the most favourable comparisons
in the given context and for which the individual's social aﬃliation is high.
Identity as beliefs
By contrast Bénabou and Tirole (2007) explicitly specify a broad class of
individual beliefs inﬂuencing their self-identity, that people value and invest
in, which in turn produce both tangible and intangible returns. Following
this line of argument, a preference for redistribution would be motivated by
giving satisfaction to an idea of oneself as a generous person insofar as it
would produce an intangible or cognitive gain. They also study the eﬀect
of endogenously arising self-serving beliefs linked to pride, dignity or wishful
thinking as nurturing social identiﬁcation, all of which can both aﬀect pro-
social behaviour and social preferences.
Identity as culture
The main drawback of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) lies in that it oﬀers no
account of how identities are formed. Partly to account for this Fang and
Loury (2005) adopt a cultural approach to identity based on deﬁning identity
as the result of social interaction rather than an expression of people's beliefs
or choices. In other words, social identity is the outcome of many individuals
making a common choice. As in Bénabou and Tirole (2007) identity is all
about self-perception. However, they deﬁne choices about identity as those
made by rational agents anticipating subsequent interaction and its payoﬀs.
It is argued that individuals adopt a similar identity because it helps them
manage collective action problems. Diﬀerent social contexts would give rise to
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diﬀerent identity equilibria. The application of this approach helps to explain
racial and social inequalities and more generally how social (dis)integration
results from cultural diﬀerences between disadvantaged groups that exacer-
bate pre-existing inequalities.
3.2.2 Pure and instrumental identity
Identity may interact with factors such as self-interest so that it is possible to
distinguish given (pure) identity from instrumental (impure) identity. The
latter is the result of a self-interested choice motivated by the attainment
of higher status. The higher a group in the status hierarchy, the more this
group can contribute to the positive payoﬀs from its members. Accordingly,
it is possible to distinguish this from Akerlof and Kranton (2000): pure
membership eﬀects form other instrumental reasons for using social identity
to ascend socially, obtain additional income and generally self interest. Pure
identity eﬀects refer to the desire and utility gain that results from acting in
compliance with one's own (inherited or not chosen) identity, which refers to
internalised social rules and personality.
Instrumental identity relies on the assumption that individuals invest in
diﬀerent identity aﬃliations (Becker and Mulligan 1997, Fang and Loury
2005, Bénabou and Tirole 2007). Identity can turn out to be a strategic
action to maximize utility and payoﬀs, rather than an inherited trait.
3.2.3 Other related concepts
It is argued that social capital is determined by culture and institutions.
For instance, institutions in place such as the welfare state may inﬂuence
preferences for redistribution, but enduring social values and cultural beliefs
underpin such institutions too. Social identity is embodied in individuals so
that social capital can be seen as an expression of social norms and culturally
induced preferences rather than a conscious choice.
Closely related to identity is the concept of proximity. Indeed, proximity
reﬂects some idea of social distance, which reﬂects for instance the extent
to which language and codes of communication as well as shared meanings
compare across individuals. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that members
of a speciﬁc group trust each other in ways that non-members do not and that
communication among members takes place, incurring smaller transaction
costs (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo 2009).
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Identity may be simply be an expression of social distance: those with
whom people identify are simply those to whom people feel closest and whose
needs are perceived to be closest to their own. Going beyond simple cate-
gorisations, the strength of identity is possibly a factor that matters but that
has until now received limited attention. One explanation for this is that
strength of identity is a diﬃcult construct to measure in natural groups. In-
evitably when identity is induced in an experiment it is hard to know the
extent to which group identity is based on the right social categorisation.
3.2.4 Modelling identity
Canonical model (Akerlof and Kranton 2000)
Although, as we have discussed in the previous section, one could deﬁne
identity in diﬀerent ways, the economics literature focuses mainly on one
convenient model of identity that has been extensively developed. In this
model, identity is based on categories, prescriptions and actions. Each person
in society belongs to one or more social categories and the prescriptions
indicate social norms associated with each social category or an ideal for each
category. A person j's utility depends on actions and identity as follows:
Uj = Uj (aj, aj, Ij) ,
where Ij is the identity of person j, aj denotes the actions of j and aj are
the actions of others. In turn identity can be modelled as:
Ij = Ij (aj, aj, cj, P ) ,
where P refers to prescriptions and cj refers to social categories.
As an extension of the Akerlof and Kranton (2000) approach Benjamin
et al. (2010) use the technique of priming in order to infer what the social
norm of a particular group is. They use a speciﬁc functional form for utility
and conceptualise one speciﬁc social categorisation to be primed with a cer-
tain strength. The person belongs to a social category, such as a language,
religious or social group with a strength s ≥ 0 which has a weight of w(s)
in the utility function. Let x denote some action that the individual may
decide to take; let the individual's preferred action in the absence of identity
considerations be x0 and let the action prescribed by identity be xc; then the
individual's utility can be expressed as:
U = − [1− w (s)] [x− x0]2 − w (s) [x− xc]2 ,
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where the weight of a zero-strength category is nil and the disutility of deviat-
ing from one's norm decreases with s. The individual chooses x to maximise
utility for a given value of s; so the ﬁrst-order condition gives the optimal
decision as:
x∗ = [1− w (s)]x0 + w (s)xc,
a weighted average of the preferred action with and without identity. The
priming eﬀect can be deﬁned as follows:
dx∗
ds
= w′ (s) [xc − x0] ,
which indicates that evoking a person's identity s in an experiment will trig-
ger preference assimilation only for those highly identiﬁed with that identity,
namely those whose actions are not too distant from those prescribed by a
speciﬁc social category.
Oppositional identities (Bisin et al. 2011)
Battu et al. (2007) and Battu and Zenou (2010) contribute to the concep-
tualisation of identity by deﬁning an individual's utility function as a set of
actions based on binary events (for example, wear the veil, G, or do not wear
the veil, B) and the intensity of its identity, so that individuals maximise the
following welfare expression:
W (x, α) = u(x, α)=λ(α)QI=C(α)
for x = (G, B) where the term λ(α)QI refers to the social utility loss for
the individual of interacting with people of diﬀerent groups, Ii and Qi are,
respectively, the psychological cost and the probability of an interaction, and
C(α) is the direct cost of an interaction. In addition, the model contains
an explanation for the persistence of identity based on the interaction of
parental and peer inﬂuence.
Identity as Status Shayo (2009)(Klor and Shayo 2010)
Another extension of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is Shayo (2009) and Klor
and Shayo (2010) where identity is conceptualised as status (Sj) as follows:
identiﬁcation with a group means caring about the status of the group. So,
consider a a number of groups labelled 1, 2, ..., J and let us suppose that every
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individual i in some group j uses another group r(j) as a point of reference.
Actions a of the individuals and their payoﬀs are represented by the status
of a group deﬁned as a function of the group's payoﬀs as follows:
Sj = Sj
(
pij (a) , pir(j) (a)
)
and the utility function is given by






where u and v are both strictly increasing functions and u is weakly concave.
A person's utility can include a measure of perceived cognitive distance as an
additive component dij that varies with peoples chosen social identiﬁcation
with a group j. The social-identity equilibrium can then be deﬁned as a
proﬁle of actions (and identiﬁcations with a group j if perceived distance is
included) that maximises people's utilities given their pay-oﬀs. Shayo (2009)
includes a preference for conformity as an extension of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000)
Based on the alternative diﬀerent models of identity we can conclude
that all of them consider identity a component to be added in the individ-
ual utility function, either directly (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) or indirectly
through status (Shayo 2009). Here identity qualiﬁes as a category that, when
made salient, inﬂuences behaviour. A distinct element of Shayo (2009) lies
in the inclusion of a theory of the endogenous determination of identities in
equilibrium.
An alternative approach : endogenising identity
Bénabou and Tirole (2007) endogenise both the identity payoﬀs as well as
the categorical prescriptions in Akerlof-Kranton alongside people's cogni-
tive costs of their actions. They do so by taking an investment perspective
whereby individuals have a stock of identity capital At+1 that is the result of
some form of investment at with a return rt as follows:
At+1 = At + rtat.
An individual's utility function depends on his knowledge about himself vi
which may not be known with certainty, his stock of identity At that can be
experienced ex-ante and his investment decisions to maximise U(vi, At, at).
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One of the potential applications of this type of modelling lies in understand-
ing how individuals make tradeoﬀs between the relative value of diﬀerent di-
mensions of their self-identity and make implicit investment decisions based
on such tradeoﬀs.
An alternative way of endogenising identity can be found in the two-
stage approach of Fang and Loury (2005) where social networks individuals
are embedded in their identity choices. They model what they call an iden-
tity code, a function that maps incomes into indicators Ci(y). Once such
conﬁgurations are ﬁxed, Fang and Loury argue that these codes determine
individual risk-sharing choices.
3.3 Measuring identity
Identity can be measured using survey questions. The latter include mea-
sures of diﬀerent types of identity, including territory (more European than
Italian), gender (being female matters), ethnicity and the like. For in-
stance, Manning and Roy (2007) adopt a measure of integration constructed
from answers to the question: What do you consider your national identity
to be? Please choose as many or as few as apply. This is similar to Aspachs-
Bracons et al. (2008) and others. Other studies build up synthetic indexes
from questions regarding the importance of religion, attitude towards inter-
marriage and the importance of racial composition in schools.Constant et al.
(2009) conjecture that an immigrant moves in a plane characterised by two
positive numbers normalised to lie between 0 to 1, with 1 representing max-
imum commitment and 0 the minimum commitment. The horizontal axis
measures commitment to and self-identiﬁcation with the country of origin
and the vertical axis measures commitment to and self-identiﬁcation with
the host country.
An alternative to survey questions is the use of experimental evidence.
Chen and Li (2009) formulate group identity based on a set of sequential
allocation games experiments on students. Benjamin et al. (2010) focus on
priming a religious concept to strengthen religious aﬃliation on students that
in turn induces participation on behavioural games.
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4 Reinterpreting the Empirical Evidence
The economics literature has long been interested in exploring evidence on
inequality and redistribution. Preferences for redistribution depend on cur-
rent and future economic position. However, the classic Meltzer and Richard
model argued that redistribution depends on the mean to median ratio of in-
come distribution (as proxying the median voter support for redistribution)
has not been empirically validated.
The empirical evidence on the determinants of redistributional prefer-
ences has grown rapidly since Meltzer and Richard (1981), but generally it
has not been able to show a clear empirical regularity that ﬁts the prescrip-
tions of classical approaches. We may identify three approaches. The ﬁrst
of these relies on the premise that it is mainly economic self-interest that
shapes pro-redistribution preferences. This premise also underlies the eco-
nomic literature on social upward mobility (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005,
Benabou and Ok 2001, Piketty 1995) as well as class-based explanations of
redistributional preferences,mainly in sociology (Svallfors 2004). The second
approach posits that not only an individual's income but also his or her val-
ues and beliefs prescribe preferences toward redistribution. Beliefs about the
causes of inequality, considerations of fairness, religious beliefs, hope for reci-
procity and altruism have been suggested as the driving forces behind the
formation of attitudes toward redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos 2005,
Bénabou and Tirole 2006, Fong 2001, Scheve and Stasavage 2006). The
third approach centers around the idea that an individual's preferences for
redistribution depend upon its eﬀect on the relative living standard of the
individual (Corneo and Grüner 2002, pp. 86-87).
In addition to the diﬀerent approaches in the literature, one can iden-
tify speciﬁc variables that correlate with redistribution preferences. Specif-
ically, income proxies self-interest which may aﬀect support for redistribu-
tion. Other variables such as marital status, employment status, education
and age, race have a very strong eﬀect: blacks are much more favourable
to redistribution than whites (Alesina and Giuliano 2010). However, it is
unclear how the evidence on these factors matches the theory.
In the classic (Meltzer and Richard 1981) model, redistribution is eﬀec-
tively determined by a decisive individual (under majority rule this is the
voter with median income): those with income below that of the decisive in-
dividual would vote for more redistribution; those with income above such a
level would vote for less redistribution, although this is not empirically estab-
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lished. Empirically, this implies a negative relationship between income and
support for redistribution. Finally, redistribution should be distinguished
from insurance against risks that are less eﬃciently insured privately (Moene
and Wallerstein 2001). Women are more pro-redistribution then men, even
though the eﬀect of gender is much smaller than that of race. More educated
people are more averse to redistribution. Left-wing supporters are more pro-
redistribution even after controlling for income, which already points in the
direction of models highlighted above where an ideological dimension mat-
ters. Protestants appear to be less favourable to redistribution.
Arguably, one of the potential features missing from this framework is
an explicit model of identity. In such a case, people are thought of holding
interpersonal preferences, namely, preferences that depend on values, atti-
tudes and other people's choices. Consistent evidence of the latter is the
following: Frey and Meier (2004) ﬁnd that student donations to university
funds are lower at the very beginning and at the very end of a student's time
at university. In other words, precisely when students are more identiﬁed
with the group, the more they are more willing to donate. Group loyalty
(Luttmer 2001), diﬀerences in status (Corneo and Grüner 2000) and race or
ethnicity (Alesina and Glaeser 2004) are identiﬁed as determinants of pro-
redistribution preferences. Below we will subsequently describe examples of
empirical evidence suggestive of an eﬀect of diﬀerent types of identity on
redistributive preferences.
4.1 Group Identity as Work Incentive
Evidence from the literature in psychology (Pettigrew 1998) and economics
(Goette et al. 2006) suggests that there is a general tendency towards in-
group preference because people are more inclined to concede rights and
entitlements to persons who are perceived as the same (rather than to those
regarded as diﬀerent). Gang et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence of group eﬀects
on a prisoner's dilemma experiment using data from natural groups in the
Swiss Army. However, when experimental data is examined results are more
mixed. Eckel and Grossman (2005) show that group identity is insuﬃcient to
enhance public-good cooperation, though actions enhancing group behaviour
do have a positive eﬀect on cooperation. In contrast, Charness et al. (2007)
ﬁnd that, using standard social identity measures, no signiﬁcant eﬀects are
found in a battle of sexes game whilst McLeish and Oxoby (2007) ﬁnd that
negative out-group opinion enforces cooperation. Finally Chen and Li (2009)
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ﬁnd evidence that group identity has signiﬁcant eﬀects on distribution pref-
erences. Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) distinguish the eﬀect of identity
resulting from simple belonging to a group from other idiosyncratic inﬂu-
ences such as social norms and other group characteristics and undertake a
valuation of group membership using incentive compatible willingness to pay
and to accept. The importance of the latter lies in the fact that, in small
and artiﬁcial groups experiments, social identity eﬀects can be manipulated
(Chen and Li 2009). Findings suggest that group identity enhances rewards
and reduces punishments, establishes distributional preferences and social
welfare-maximising actions. Consistent with this Klor and Shayo (2010) ﬁnd
that over a third of the population deviates from self interest in supporting
group tax rates.
In regards to modelling identity and work incentives, Akerlof and Kranton
(2005) envisage corporate culture as triggering the division of workers into
diﬀerent groups, the prescribed behaviour for each group and the extent to
which workers identify with the organization or with the work group and, as
a result in adopting their respective organisational goals.
4.2 National and Class Identity Clubs
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that preferences and attitudes to-
wards the welfare state diﬀerent between eastern and western Germany as
reﬂecting endurance and communist values. However, using contingent val-
uation techniques for the world cup as a case study, Süssmuth et al. (2009)
ﬁnd that such eﬀects are less lasting. Burlando and Hey (1997) ﬁnd evidence
of signiﬁcant cultural eﬀects, showing that that in a public-good experiment
context, Italians are more likely to contribute than English. Other evidence
that is consistent with the latter is empirical evidence showing that attitudes
towards migration reﬂect nationalist sentiments (O'Rourke and Sinnot 2006).
In dealing with national identity, it becomes essential to distinguish both
cultural and legal dimensions. Whilst the latter is reﬂected in diﬀerences in
attachments and norms, the former relies on a related concept that in some
dimensions coincides with that of identity.
Class identiﬁcation is found to predict voting behaviour (Evans 2000).
Empirical evidence from Shayo (2009, 2010) suggests that indeed status does
exert an inﬂuence in explaining identity-related behaviour. Poorer people are
more likely to be nationalistic (Shayo 2009), which is explained by a greater
similarity to the national prototype.
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Furthermore, the formation of a group requires the existence of an outer
group in such a way that the absence an outer group can be argued to in-
hibit cooperation when committing to global agreements is costly (Wichardt
2008). Casey and Dustmann (2010) examine ethnic identity in Germany
and ﬁnd that children of immigrants identify more strongly with their home
country than with the host country. Both mothers and fathers have a very
weak sense of German identity and identify quite strongly with their native
country. As expected, they also ﬁnd that the time spent in Germany in-
creases the probability of reporting a German identity. In contrast, Nekby
and Rödin (2010) analyse the question of ethnic identity in Sweden. Their
results indicate that the feeling of togetherness with the Swedish majority
culture is not systematically connected to the probability of feeling a strong
connection with the minority culture.
4.3 Gender and Language Clubs
Language and gender form naturally occurring groups that merit special
study. Cadsby and Maynes (1998) examine whether gender identity inﬂu-
ence voluntary contributions to public goods and ﬁnd that gender does not
exert signiﬁcant eﬀects. However, in a threshold public-goods experiment
Croson et al. (2003) ﬁnd that gender identity is signiﬁcant in a naturally
occurring group. Solow and Kirkwood (2002) ﬁnd evidence of gender group
behaviour on public-good contributions. Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnd that
in two laboratory experiments making gender identity more salient induces
some conformity with gender induced norms.
Consistently with the idea that communication between members of a
group leads to lower transaction costs, a common language is expected to
help to enhance a sense of belonging as has been shown in the case of Cat-
alonia and the Basque Country (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008). Language
can be an important marker of social identity by aﬀecting people's inter-
dependence and people may seek social mobility by using the language of a
more highly evaluated group, such as the Catalan case. Language is explored
as a determinant of cultural identity and as explaining economic exchange
in Germany (Falk et al. 2010). The importance of language is picked up in
the association between, ethnolinguistic diversity and redistribution, or the
provision of public goods (Desmet et al. 2009).
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4.4 Ethnicity and Migration
The Battu et al. (2007) model  where non-whites identify with their social
environment, their culture of origin and where social networks can ﬁnd them
jobs  reveals that people, who are otherwise identical, end up with totally
diﬀerent choices. Depending on how strong peer pressures are, non-whites
choose to adopt `oppositional' identities because some people may identify
with the dominant culture and others may reject it, even if it implies adverse
labour market outcomes. In a further empirical study Battu and Zenou
(2010) investigate the relationship between ethnic identity and employment.
They ﬁnd that in the UK people's identity choice is greatly inﬂuenced by their
social environment, that there is considerable heterogeneity in the non-white
population in terms of preferences and that those non-whites who develop
and manifest oppositional and extreme identities are penalized in the labour
market, experiencing a 6% to 7% lower probability of being in employment.
Bisin et al. (2006) ﬁnd that, in line with their theoretical analysis, identity
with and socialisation of an ethnic minority are more pronounced in mixed
than in segregated neighbourhoods. The strength of identiﬁcation with the
majority culture regardless of the strength of (ethnic) minority identity is
important for labour market outcomes (Nekby and Rödin 2010).
Migration changes the social composition of the welfare state clientele;
under the conditions of greater social heterogeneity it becomes more diﬃ-
cult to gain the endorsement of the welfare state. Bay and Pedersen (2006)
demonstrate how support for speciﬁc social welfare beneﬁts greatly depends
on the composition of the group receiving welfare. Greif (1994) shows that
ethnic networks adopting a common set of institutional rules reduce the cost
of coordination and enforcement. Darity et al. (2006) use an evolutionary
game to explain the formation of racial identity being the result of both
intra- and inter-group interactions. Keely and Tan (2008) ﬁnd that general
views on redistribution are heterogeneous according to race as well as income
determinants including socioeconomic background, age, and gender. Speciﬁc
views on welfare are heterogeneous primarily according to race.
Similarly, studies examining racial identity argue that people tend to
adopt the identity of the dominant group. Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003)
ﬁnd that mixed-race people beneﬁted when they could form a distinct racial
class falling between between dominant white and subordinate black. Ear-
lier contributions include Stewart (1997), that provided an initial attempt to
formalize an economic analysis of identity. He argues that the intensity of
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racialcultural identity is a commodity that should be included in the indi-
vidual's utility function. Individual racialcultural identity is an argument
in the individual utility that is aﬀected by the prevailing norms of own- and
other-group racialcultural identity. Consistently, the intertemporal change
in the stock of own-group racialcultural identity is a complex composite of
individuals' identities. Bernhard et al. (2006) ﬁnd evidence of identity-driven
altruism in the context of native population in Papua New Guinea, there was
evidence of intra-group altruism. Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) ﬁnd using
data from Arab communities that voters are more likely to vote for a candi-
date that shares their social group identity. More speciﬁcally, people not only
cared about themselves in voting, but on the beneﬁts of their hamula (com-
munity organisation). Furthermore Darity et al. (2006) use an evolutionary
game model of the formation of racial identity. The construction of racial
identity is the result of both intra- and inter-group interactions. Their ﬁnd-
ings indicate one type of equilibrium labelled as an individualist social norm,
where all persons pursue an individualist identity strategy; thus race is in-
signiﬁcant for both market and non-market social interactions. A second type
of equilibrium is a racialist social norm, where all persons pursue a racialist
identity strategy: race is signiﬁcant for both market and non-market social
interactions. Fryer and Torelli (2005) ﬁnd that acting white behavioural
norms among blacks in the US (in other words, associating academic suc-
cess to lack of identity) are more developed in racially mixed schools, and
inﬂuence behaviour of certain minorities. Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnd that
when ethnic identity is made salient Asian-Americans make more patient
choices and blacks make more risk averse choices. Furthermore, Watson and
McLanahan (2009) ﬁnd that relative income of a local reference group de-
termine marriage decisions. Finally, Constant and Zimmermann (2008) ﬁnd
that the ethnic identity of immigrants is a strong determinant of their labour
force participation.
In explaining attitudes towards the welfare state one might argue that
they are inﬂuenced by whether people are skilled workers or not, given that
the welfare state aﬀects the net earnings of the better oﬀ, including as skilled
workers. If traditional economic models hold, then attitudes towards a re-
distributive institution should only be determined by the net gain people
receive from them. On the other hand, attitudes towards the welfare state
may reﬂect social values instead. The latter include cultural preferences or
locally formed values and memories of the past where people derive utility
from attaining a better match between their identity and their actions.
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4.5 Religion Clubs
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) ﬁnd that certain religious aﬃliations are asso-
ciated with a higher preference for redistribution. Benjamin et al. (2010),
reports experimental evidence building on a model inspired by Akerlof and
Kranton (2000), examine how the saliency of religious identity inﬂuences
people's choices. They ﬁnd that the saliency of religious identity stimulates
individual contributions to public goods. However, they do not ﬁnd sup-
portive evidence that religious identity aﬀect work eﬀort and generosity in a
dictator game. Furthermore, Guiso et al. (2003) ﬁnd that religion matters
as a driver of economic attitudes. Bisin et al. (2004) show that religious so-
cialization across US states is more intense when a religion is in a minority.
Furthermore, Bisin et al. (2008) examine religious identity in the UK. Using
the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM), they undertake
an empirical analysis of religious identity, to explore quantitative and quali-
tative diﬀerences in the process of cultural integration between Muslims and
other UK minorities. Their ﬁndings indicate that having an intense religious
identity is roughly twice as large for Muslims as for non-Muslims. For Mus-
lims, the number of years since arrival does not seem to be related to their
inclination to assimilate to their home country. Interestingly, other ﬁndings
indicate that a Muslim born having spent there more than 30 years is com-
parable with a non-Muslim just arrived to the UK. Similarly, Constant et al.
(2006) adopt a deﬁnition of integration that accounts for several cultural and
religious factors, including social interactions, and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
integration patterns for Muslims and Christians in Germany.
Manning and Roy (2007, 2010), using the UK Labour Force Survey in
2001, ﬁnd no evidence of a culture clash in general, and none connected
with Muslims in particular. More speciﬁcally, they report that a large frac-
tion of those individuals in the sample who are born in Britain actually report
a British national identity and that such fraction is larger for third than for
second-generation immigrants. Finally, Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnd that reli-
gious identity aﬀects contributions to public goods, Protestantism (Catholi-
cism) increases (decreases) contributions, and Judaism increases worker reci-




Incorporating social identity into economic analysis can provide useful alter-
native explanations to overcome the empirical limitations of the traditional
Meltzer and Richard (1981) approach to explain why societies redistribute.
Identity may inﬂuence how people behave  speciﬁcally their pro-social be-
haviour  as well as more general attitudes towards redistribution. How-
ever, the empirical identiﬁcation of identity on redistributive preference is
far from straightforward. Identity can exert second-order eﬀects on redis-
tributive institutions, that in turn have an eﬀect on individual preferences
for redistribution. For instance, the welfare state, as a (potentially) redis-
tributive institution, was assembled from pre-existing social bonds. At the
same time it can be argued that, as an institution, welfare programmes may
have contributed to strengthening such bonds between its members, so that
the relationship between identity and redistribution is likely to be recur-
sive. Diﬀerent cultures may emphasize in diﬀerent ways the relative merits
of equality versus individualism, an issue discussed in detail by Alesina and
Glaeser (2004); therefore some form of circularity exists between individual
and societal attitudes to inequality and preferences for redistribution.
Methodologies to identify and measure identity are varied and still being
developed; they can be divided into those derived from experimental evi-
dence and those derived from survey evidence. Two studies have explored
the association of social identity and pro-social behaviour using controlled
experiments that hold strong internal validity. Chen and Li (2009) have ex-
amined directly the question of group identity and social preferences using
experimental evidence. Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) found that group
membership reduces charitable giving to outsiders. Another type of evi-
dence comes from econometric studies, which generally contain high external
validity when carefully undertaken. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) examine
evidence for an individual's redistribution preferences using the General So-
cial Survey and the World Values Survey and ﬁnd that historical experiences
and culture matter. Experimental end econometric ﬁndings taken together
are consistent with the general idea that social identity and preferences for
redistribution are causally connected. Similarly, we may conclude that there
is robust evidence that individual self-interest alone fails to explain social
behaviour.
One important question in modelling identity lies in separating those
components of identity that are endogenous because they result from people's
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choices (instrumental identity) and those that are given. People are not
entirely free to choose their own identity given that it may be imposed on
them in the light of others' behaviour and perceptions. Some consensus in
the identity literature indicates that interactions within social groups make
interaction with non-members less desirable: stronger identiﬁcation within a
group will increase cooperation with this group relative to others. However,
evidence from artiﬁcial and natural groups exhibits diﬀerent results.
A question that remains to be researched further concerns the mech-
anisms through which identity operates. Preference interdependence may
result from the presence of forms of social identiﬁcation within some refer-
ence groups, in the form of so called reference dependent preferences (Loomes
et al. 2003). Another possible behavioural explanation lies in the existence
of a conﬁrmatory bias, which implies that once an individual forms a strong
hypothesis about something they tend to be inattentive to new information
(Rabin 1998). Some other explanations can be found in the neuro-economics
literature where neuro-transmitters and levels of serotonin are found to cor-
relate with preference interdependence (Zizzo 2002).
It can be argued that, although social identity has been a category falling
outside the realm of economics (mainly studied within the social psychology
and sociology literatures), identity cannot be ignored if economic phenomena
such as redistributive preferences are to be adequately understood and em-
pirically modelled. Among the most important questions that need further
examination we should highlight the need of connecting further social identity
with other related approaches such as club goods. Whilst the mainstream lit-
erature associates identity as following from categories underpinning status,
there is a parallel literature that links identity with self-esteem and beliefs
in which people invest. Finally, it is important to point out that at the mo-
ment most studies employ a partial measure of social identity based on some
categorisation (e.g., nation, gender, language etc), but we know little about
which categories matter the most, and how people trade them oﬀ.
As far as policy is concerned, the recognition of the importance of so-
cial identity within economics suggests the need to go beyond simplistic no-
tions of equality and opens the door to the understanding of policy solutions
to stigma, exclusion, xenophobia and racism among other social behaviour.
More generally, it points to the role of identity as a key social choice.
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